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Seeing and Tagging Things
in Pictures
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth?
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?
—John Keats, ‘‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’’
Tagging Magritte
AR T UK , FO R M E R L Y K N O W N A S Your Paintings, is an ambitious
project to document and make accessible online all the paintings that are
held by public museums in Great Britain. Launched at the National Gallery
in June 2011, it was initially supported by the British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration and the Public Catalogue Foundation (now also renamed Art UK),
a registered charity established in 2003.1 By August 2015, more than two
hundred thousand paintings had been photographed for the project’s data-
base.2 Basic metadata for each painting was supplied by museum profes-
sionals, but more detailed metadata was crowdsourced by online volunteers,
who ‘‘tagged’’ individual images with descriptive terms that could be entered
in a search engine to call up relevant paintings. An interim history of the
project noted that economy was a major incentive for the crowdsourcing: ‘‘It
was obvious that it would be prohibitively expensive to pay expert fine art
cataloguers to describe all 200,000 paintings systematically and that some
sort of voluntary system would have to be devised.’’ Crowdsourcing prom-
ised the contributing museums other benefits as well, including ‘‘the poten-
tial to engage both existing and new audiences,’’ and the discovery of
vernacular (rather than expert) search terms responsive to the interests of
‘‘the widest set of potential users.’’3
abstract Despite modernist precepts, digital projects that use crowdsourcing to annotate large
collections of images of paintings and book illustrations with ‘‘tags’’ have encouraged viewers to see
things in pictures and to say what they see. Both personal image tagging (ekphrastic in function) and
automatic image tagging challenge in different ways the proposition that a painting as such will elide
recognizable content. Representations 155. Summer 2021 © The Regents of the University of
California. ISSN 0734-6018, electronic ISSN 1533-855X, pages 82–109. All rights reserved. Direct
requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content to the University of California
Press at https://www.ucpress.110 edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/
rep.2021.155.4.82.82
The technical infrastructure for Your Paintings Tagger was modeled
on that of Galaxy Zoo, a crowdsourcing project that an international
consortium of astrophysicists had launched in 2007 to classify photo-
graphic images of galaxies by type. Galaxy Zoo proved to be a surprising
success, quickly enlisting thousands of volunteers to classify hundreds of
thousands of galaxy images.4 At the end of 2009, that platform became
Zooniverse, offering to host the crowdsourcing of large nongalactic data
sets for other projects.5 The first such addition was soon launched (Solar
Stormwatch); and by 2014 twenty sites were up and running.6 Most of the
scores of Zooniverse projects that are now active, paused, or complete
have to do with ‘‘citizen science’’ strictly speaking. However, two of them
pertain to art history in different ways. AnnoTate, a project launched in
2015, has focused on documentary history; volunteers transcribe certain
artists’ personal papers in the collection of the Tate Archive.7 Fishing in
the Past, launched in April 2020 and largely complete by January 2021, is
a project more directly relevant to questions of visual representation. For
that project, more than two thousand volunteers have proposed identi-
fications of kinds of fish that are depicted in more than a thousand
European oil paintings dating from 1550 to 1880; the results, concern-
ing the distribution and consumption of different species at different
places and times, will inform ichthyological and cultural history.8 The
method (crowdsourcing the identification of things depicted in paint-
ings) follows the pioneering work of Art UK, which, although not for-
mally part of Zooniverse, is one of its oldest offspring and the most
important crowdsourcing project in art history.
More than six million tags were entered into the Your Paintings Tagger
system by volunteers; these were automatically aggregated and assessed by
quantity and also quality—for which consistency is a proxy. Originally, at
least fifteen taggers had to contribute to a tag set before it could be
accepted; later that threshold was reduced somewhat.9 To gain acceptance,
a particular tag had to be submitted by at least two contributors—except for
the category ‘‘Types’’ (for example, Still life, Portrait), for which the thresh-
old was four. (Investigation for a pioneer project, discussed later in the
essay, had determined that museum staff found a tag to be ‘‘useful’’ 88.2
percent of the time when only one user proposed it; 96.8 percent of the time
when two users concurred; and in every case when four or more users did
so.)10 When the tags assigned to a painting reached their assessment thresh-
olds, they were added to the public search interface, enabling a user to find
paintings tagged pipe, for example.
As of 25 June 2016, the Art UK website reported that the Tagger site had
been ‘‘temporarily suspended’’ pending improvements to be made to the
interface and the achievement of funding goals.11 The following account
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focuses on the project’s original arrangements but also considers its later
engagement with ‘‘artificial intelligence.’’12
A Your Paintings tagger first responded to the open-ended question
‘‘What Things or Ideas can you see in this painting?’’ and then was asked
to identify any ‘‘People,’’ ‘‘Places,’’ or ‘‘Events’’ depicted before being asked
to choose a subject-matter label from a list and a genre (‘‘Type’’) label from
another list.13 To tag a painting with some care might take several minutes.
A ‘‘Frequent questions’’ page at the Your Paintings Tagger website
addressed more than a dozen questions about the project. For example:
How does it work?
Each painting will be tagged many times by members of the public, and algorithms
behind the scenes will calculate which tags are likely to be the most accurate. These
tags will then be fed through to the Your Paintings website. The algorithms have
been created for the Public Catalogue Foundation by the Citizen Science Alliance
based at the Astrophysics Department at the University of Oxford, with input from
the Art History Department at the University of Glasgow.
And:
What happens if I make a mistake?
Don’t worry if you feel you have made a mistake. Many people will tag each painting
and only the tags that the algorithm calculates are most likely to be the best answer
will be used on the final Your Paintings website.
The most intriguing part of the catechism is this exchange:
Do I need to know anything about art?
No knowledge of art or art history is needed. Instead, all we ask is that you look
carefully at the paintings and tell us what you see.14
Look carefully at the paintings and tell us what you see. For such a task some
‘‘knowledge of art or art history’’ might be inhibiting. To know René
Magritte’s painting La trahison des images is to discover that ‘‘what we see’’
is not what it seems to be: ‘‘Ceçi n’est pas une pipe’’ (fig. 1). Michel Foucault
celebrated some of Magritte’s drawings related to this painting for disrupt-
ing, as effectively as any abstract canvas by Wassily Kandinsky, received ideas
or ‘‘principles’’ of ‘‘Western Painting . . . from the 15th to the 20th century,’’
one of which ‘‘proposes the equivalence between the fact of similitude and
the affirmation of a representative link.’’
That a figure should resemble a thing (or some other figure), that there should be
a relation of analogy between them, is sufficient to assert in all our painting an
obvious, banal, thousand-times-repeated and yet almost always silent statement (it is
like an endless, haunting murmur which surrounds the figures’ silence, invades it,
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seizes, dispossesses, and finally shifts it into the realm of things we can name):
‘‘What you see, is that.’’15
Magritte’s Trahison subverts that silent statement. It would take some insou-
ciance to tag this painting with the word pipe. Yet that indeed is what has
been done at the website of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art
(LACMA), which owns the painting and had it socially tagged, probably
using an American prototype system called steve.museum, to which I will
return. The full set of tags at the LACMA site reads (as of 17 January 2021):
‘‘misleading, irony, french, pipe, simple, surreal, writing, brown, black,
tan.’’16
Look carefully at the painting and tell us what you see. What someone sees, is
that.
Re-citing Matisse
Almost as well known as the lesson of Trahison is the cautionary
reply that Henri Matisse gave to a ‘‘lady’’ who, visiting his studio, criticized
a painting because the arm of the woman that it depicted was too long:
‘‘Madame,’’ he said, ‘‘you are mistaken: that is not a woman, that is
a painting.’’
figure 1. René Magritte, The Treachery of Images (This is Not a Pipe) (La trahison des
images [Ceci n’est pas une pipe]). Oil on canvas. 1928. Los Angeles County
Museum of Art. © 2021 C. Herscovici /Artists Rights Society (ARS), New
York.
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This anecdote has been told many times, to illustrate the nonrepresen-
tational, antimimetic quality of modern art, postmodern art, and, some-
times, all art. E. H. Gombrich told the story twice in Art and Illusion: A
Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, a landmark account of picto-
rial mimesis and its technical history. Each time he told the story he gave it
a summative significance.
In early editions of that book, Gombrich told the story to conclude his
account of ancient beliefs about the power of art, such as the myth of
Pygmalion, which would ascribe to the artist the full power of poesis—a god-
like power of creation that unfortunately entailed a magical curse. The
antidote to such hubris was the Matisse anecdote:
We may have made quite a good bargain when we exchanged the archaic magic of
image making for the more subtle magic we call ‘‘art.’’ For without this new category
of ‘‘pictures,’’ image making would still be hedged in by taboos. Only in the realm of
dreams has the artist found full freedom to create. I think the difference is well
summed up in the anecdote about Matisse. When a lady visiting his studio said, ‘‘But
surely, the arm of this woman is much too long,’’ the artist replied politely,
‘‘Madame, you are mistaken. This is not a woman, this is a picture.’’17
Gombrich refers to this as ‘‘the anecdote about Matisse,’’ suggesting that it
was already in circulation and might be recognized; but in a note he docu-
ments a somewhat different version—what he called ‘‘the master’s own
version of the anecdote,’’ written for the literary and artistic review Le Point
in 1939: ‘‘J’ai répondu à quelqu’un qui disait que je ne voyais pas les femmes
comme je les représentais: Si j’en rencontrais de pareilles dans la rue, je me
sauverais épouventé. Avant tout, je ne crée pas une femme, je fais un tab-
leau.’’18 In his collection of the artist’s writings, Matisse on Art (1973), Jack D.
Flam translated this passage as follows, supplying also the previous sen-
tences: ‘‘Someone called me: ‘This charmer who takes pleasure in charming
monsters.’ I never thought of my creations as charmed or charming mon-
sters. I replied to someone who said I didn’t see women as I represented
them: ‘If I met such women in the street, I should run away in terror.’ Above
all, I do not create a woman, I make a picture.’’19
In a note to this passage, Flam identifies the ‘‘someone’’ in both
instances as Gertrude Stein, although he does not explain why (167n6).
(In the revised edition of 1995 he reassigns the first mention of ‘‘someone’’
to someone else, and drops the Stein reference even for the second.)20
Stein, of course, was one of Matisse’s most important early patrons.
Although this version of the anecdote would cast her at least for the moment
as a critic of his vision of art, she generally shared his ambition to free
painting from representational obligations. Gustave Courbet’s realist land-
scapes, admittedly premodern but also protomodern, presented a difficult
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case: looking so much like nature, could they be art? She worried that
question in Lectures in America (1935):
Courbet bothered me. He did really use the color that nature looked like that any
landscape looked like when it was just like itself as you saw it in passing. Courbet
really did use the colors that nature looked like to anybody, that a water-fall in the
woods looked like to anybody.
And what had that to do with anything, in fact did it not destroy a little of the reality
of the oil painting. The paintings of Courbet were very real as oil paintings, they
existed very really as oil painting, but did the colors that were the colors anybody
could see trees and water-falls naturally were, did these colors add or did they
detract from the reality of the oil painting as oil painting. Perhaps and most likely
perhaps it did not really make any difference. There was a moment though when I
worried about the Courbets not being an oil painting but being a piece of country in
miniature as seen in a diminishing glass. . . . But soon I concluded that no, it only
seemed so, no the Courbets were really oil paintings with the real life of oil paintings
as oil paintings should have. Only the Courbets being nearly something else always
keeps them from being really all they are.21
If Stein were to tag Courbet’s The Mill at Orbe (fig. 2) for Your Paintings, she
would have to resort to words such as ‘‘mill,’’ ‘‘waterfall,’’ ‘‘tree,’’ and ‘‘moun-
tain,’’ and she would feel uncomfortable about the whole business.
Gombrich renewed his Matisse anecdote at the end of the preface, titled
‘‘Images and Signs,’’ that he wrote for the final edition of Art and Illusion.22
This time the foil to mimesis was not poesis à la Pygmalion but semiosis à la
figure 2. Gustave Courbet, The Mill at Orbe. Oil on canvas. 1875. © Amgueddfa
Cymru—National Museum of Wales. Photo credit: National Museum of
Wales.
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Nelson Goodman; for in 1968 that philosopher had launched an influential
argument that images were not (as Gombrich thought) a matter of con-
structed resemblance but rather of code, very much like language, and so
should be addressed within semiotic theory.23 Such views became a new
orthodoxy, and Gombrich dissented from it in an essay he published in
1981, ‘‘Image and Code: Scope and Limits of Conventionalism in Pictorial
Representation.’’24 Most of the new preface to Art and Illusion renews his
critique of a merely semiotic account of picturing. Near the end, however,
he shifts the argument from the philosophy of representation to its history.
Evidently photography had usurped the mimetic function of art, causing
painters to embrace a nonmimetic, modernist formalism—a formalism that
was akin to code. In a crisp, if surprising, sports metaphor he remarks, ‘‘as
soon as Daguerre’s and Fox Talbot’s mechanical methods entered the field,
art had to shift the goalposts’’ (xxxv). The move was a defensive one, pro-
voked by the representational power of photography. Then, a final
paragraph:
An anecdote about Matisse which I quote in Art and Illusion, sums it all up. When
a lady, looking at one of his portraits, told him that the arm of the woman was too
long, he replied: ‘‘Madam, you are mistaken, this is not a woman, this is a painting.’’
No wonder Matisse’s contemporary, the art dealer Daniel Kahnweiler, wrote that
paintings should be seen as signs, and not as illusory objects. (xxxv)
Again, this vivid anecdote ‘‘sums it all up’’; but all it sums up is the retreat to
modernism. To account for the progressively representational art of the
previous centuries, Gombrich implies, one needs to read the rest of Art and
Illusion.
The idea that photography drove painters to abstraction dates back
several decades before Gombrich. ‘‘The camera has done much to oust
painting from its position as an art of representation,’’ observed Charles
H. Caffin, specifically apropos Matisse, in his popular primer How to Study
the Modern Painters (1914). ‘‘Matisse has no interest in the use of painting as
a means of representing the external appearances of life and nature. He has
no desire to compete with the camera.’’25 (Caffin had earlier remarked that
Matisse found photography to be merely a useful tool for the artist and not
an art in itself.)26
Where did Gombrich come upon his favored anecdote, which he evi-
dently knew before Matisse published his own ‘‘version’’ in Le Point? He does
not say, but a possible source was John Dewey, who, in Art as Experience
(1934), endorsed some aspects of l’art pour l’art as they had been articulated
by A. C. Bradley in ‘‘Poetry for Poetry’s Sake,’’ his inaugural lecture as
professor of poetry at the University of Oxford (1901).27 Dewey follows
Bradley in distinguishing the mere referential ‘‘subject’’ of art from its
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wrought ‘‘substance.’’ Works of art are things in themselves, not reminders
of something else. According to Dewey, Matisse’s rebuke is exemplary:
‘‘Madam, that is not a woman; that is a picture.’’ The critics who drag in extraneous
subject-matter—historical, moral, sentimental, or in the guise of established canons
that prescribe proper themes—may be vastly superior in learning to the guide in the
gallery who says nothing about paintings as pictures and a great deal about the occa-
sions which produced them and the sentimental associations they arouse, the
majesty of Mount Blanc or the tragedy of Anne Boleyn; but esthetically they stand
on the same level.28
In this satire the art critic or the gallery guide may not quite descend to
tagging the Things they see in a painting, but they do say ‘‘a great deal’’
about the Ideas—‘‘the sentimental associations they arouse’’—which seems
as bad, or even worse.
Dewey’s guide in the gallery, dispatched with just a few words, will return
half a century later to suffer the elaborate scorn of Jacques Derrida, a differ-
ent kind of philosopher who yet shared Dewey’s modernist impatience with
mere representation. The errant guide this time is Martin Heidegger, who
had waxed enthusiastic about the rural virtues implied by a Van Gogh paint-
ing of a pair of shoes (fig. 3). Derrida objects to ‘‘the massive self-assurance
of the identification: ‘a pair of peasants’ shoes,’ just like that! Where did he
get that from? Where does he explain himself on this matter?’’29 Evidently,
image tagging requires scrupulous justification. And then Derrida imposes
an extended metaphor, in which Heidegger is a tedious, sentimental gallery
guide, who ‘‘piles up the associations and immediate projections. From time
to time he points out of the window to the fields and nobody notices that
he’s no longer talking about painting.’’ Bad enough, perhaps; but
figure 3. Vincent van Gogh, A Pair of
Shoes. Oil on canvas. 1886. Van Gogh
Museum, Amsterdam (Vincent van
Gogh Foundation).
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Heidegger’s first failing in this gallery, which Derrida remarks at the outset,
is his ‘‘consumerlike hurry toward the content of a representation’’ (292).
Pre-iconography, Photography
Is it wrong to for a philosopher, critic, or gallery guide to ‘‘tag’’
a painting as if it were a documentary photograph? Although modernist
formalism took on an imperial reach and cast a wide net, catching Courbet
and other artists before him, it is hard to appreciate a William Hogarth
painting such as Captain Lord George Graham in His Cabin, 1715–47 (1742–
44; figs. 4 and 5) without noticing things such as the large clay pipe near the
center of the picture. And there are other things to tag there: cabin, window,
dog, wineglass, wig, gravy, Chinese bowl, table, tablecloth, book, paper, drum, fife, not
to mention the persons and their articles of clothing. Hogarth scholarship
must see such things, and so Ronald Paulson, the dean of Hogarth scholars,
mentions many of them in his brief accounts of the painting.30
And now we are asked to see and say such things for representational
paintings in general. The pioneer project for such work, which served
as a model for Your Paintings Tagger, was called ‘‘steve,’’ also known as
‘‘steve.museum.’’ Sponsored by a consortium of museums in the United
States from October 2006 to December 2008, it investigated how crowd-
sourced tagging of object images might enhance curatorial metadata and
figure 4. William Hogarth, Captain Lord George Graham, 1715–47, in His Cabin. Oil
on canvas. 1742–44. © National Maritime Museum, Greenwich,
London.
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improve institutional outreach. Jennifer Trant, the principal investigator,
published a final report in January 2009, and several participant institutions
launched crowdsourced tagging initiatives for items in their collections.31
The works tagged by volunteers during the trial ranged across media types,
with paintings constituting the largest share, though not a majority (35.8
percent). Prints, photographs, and drawings and watercolors added 4.4,
5.6, and 5.3 percent respectively. In other words, only half of the objects that
were photographed for tagging were two-dimensional images; the others were
pieces of sculpture, ‘‘decorative arts and utilitarian objects,’’ ‘‘costume and
jewelry,’’ and the like (14). Some consideration was given to presenting items
of a similar type in sequence, to prevent ‘‘the jarring sense of seeing a non-
representational contemporary painting right after a classical sculpture’’
(81). ‘‘It did appear . . . that showing unrelated works in random order was
the least effective presentation’’ (91). The general question of representa-
tional painting versus nonrepresentational painting was not explored in the
report, although images were coded in the database with the numeral 1 ‘‘if
object depicted is representational (not abstract)’’ (Appendix I-13). In such
a case, a painting that depicted a pipe might be tagged pipe. (That the word
‘‘pipe’’ is ambiguous as regards fluids, music, or tobacco is a fault of language,
not of pictures.) This is (a picture of) a woman, and might be tagged woman.
(Indeed, in the trial set the most common tag was woman [32].) That it is
a picture goes without saying: no need to tag it picture. (However, tags iden-
tifying the medium would be informative and therefore helpful: painting, oil
on canvas—or Stein’s essential term, oil painting.)
figure 5. Detail of figure 4. © National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London.
Seeing and Tagging Things in Pictures 91
When Judith L. Klavans and others later analyzed subject-matter catego-
rization in the steve.museum project they focused on a hundred ‘‘images of
two-dimensional, representational paintings’’ from that collection, exclud-
ing ‘‘images of an abstract nature,’’ because a standard framework for image
cataloging was ‘‘designed for representational images.’’32 They noted that
taggers of representational images paid relatively little attention to ‘‘visual
elements’’ (color, texture, outline, and the like), focusing their attention
instead on aspects of subject matter (8). Evidently such behavior ignored
Stein’s preferences and fulfilled Foucault’s bleak prediction.
A standard that Klavans and her colleagues drew upon for their analysis,
which was designed by Sara Shatford in 1986 and is sometimes called the
Shatford-Panofsky matrix, elaborates to a set of twelve facets the three basic
categories that Erwin Panofsky defined in 1939, in the introduction to his
influential treatise Studies in Iconology: ‘‘pre-iconographical,’’ ‘‘iconographi-
cal,’’ and ‘‘iconological.’’33 According to Panofsky the pre-iconographical
category concerns ‘‘Primary or Natural Subject matter, subdivided into fac-
tual and expressional.’’
It is apprehended by identifying pure forms, that is: certain configurations of line
and colour, or certain peculiarly shaped lumps of bronze or stone, as representa-
tions of natural objects such as human beings, animals, plants, houses, tools and so
forth; by identifying their mutual relations as events; and by perceiving such expres-
sional qualities as the mournful character of a pose or gesture, or the homelike and
peaceful atmosphere of an interior. The world of pure forms thus recognized as
carriers of primary or natural meanings may be called the world of artistic motifs. An
enumeration of these motifs would be a pre-iconographical description of the work of
art.34
It is mostly these aspects of a painting that the Your Paintings Tagger would
inventory: represented objects (‘‘Things’’ in the Tagger catechism), ‘‘expres-
sional qualities’’ (‘‘Ideas’’), and events (‘‘Event’’). However, ‘‘things’’ and
‘‘ideas’’ are sufficiently ambiguous terms to embrace also data from Panofs-
ky’s second category, ‘‘Secondary or Conventional Subject matter,’’ the
domain of iconography (6); or even from his third, ‘‘Intrinsic Meaning or
Content,’’ the domain of iconology (7). Still, most volunteered tags will
involve pre-iconographical things or ideas. Despite Dewey and Matisse, one
must start somewhere.
A relevant starting place for all these investigations is the late history of
photography. If the representational prowess of that new invention
prompted painters to retreat from representation, it soon also fostered the
academic discipline of art history by representing artworks in shareable,
published photographs.35 Now, in the twenty-first century, digital photog-
raphy is everyone’s representational tool. Few people can draw, but every-
one can photograph, and everyone sees in photographs things that can be
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named. The pioneering website Flickr made it easy not only to share per-
sonal photographs but also to tag them with specific identity information—
information that Panofsky would assign to the second stage of description,
iconographical. Before long, more than a hundred institutions, including
the Library of Congress and the British Library, made use of the Flickr
Commons infrastructure to publish thousands of photographic images to
be tagged, many of them images of works of art.36 Some of these taggable
images had been created in the first place as photographs; however,
regardless of the original medium, whether painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture, all works of art had to become digital photographs to enter the
Commons. Such clearing houses of public photography encouraged not
a modernist tact but a naive realism, premodern or (at least in the chro-
nological sense) postmodern: not a seeing of the picture but a seeing of
the woman there. ‘‘All we ask is that you look carefully at the paintings and
tell us what you see.’’
Tagging as Ekphrasis
According to Ruth Webb, ekphrasis was an obscure term in classical
rhetoric, denoting vivid description in general (not necessarily of art
objects), until it entered the English critical vocabulary in the 1950s with
the publication of Leo Spitzer’s article ‘‘The ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn,’ or
Content vs. Metagrammar.’’37 Early on, Spitzer briefly remarked that John
Keats’s poem ‘‘belongs to the genre, known to Occidental literature from
Homer and Theocritus to the Parnassians and Rilke, of the ekphrasis, the
poetic description of a pictorial or sculptural work of art’’ (206–7). Later, he
reminded the reader that ‘‘the ekphrasis [is] the description of an objet
d’art by the medium of the word’’ (218). A fuller account, and wider
publicity for the term ekphrasis, would come with the publication in 1960
of ‘‘Ekphrasis and Aesthetic Attitudes in Vasari’s Lives,’’ by Svetlana Leon-
tief Alpers—an article that began life under the supervision of E. H. Gom-
brich, ‘‘in whose seminar at Harvard [it] was begun and whose valuable
suggestions and constant interest enabled it to progress,’’ and that even-
tually found an influential forum in the Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld
Institutes.38
Focusing on Giorgio Vasari’s many descriptions of particular paintings
in Le Vite de’ più eccellenti pittori, scultori e architetti (Florence, 1550), Alpers
characterizes them as exercises in ‘‘the rhetorical figure of ekphrasis’’—that
is, ‘‘verbal evocations of actual paintings,’’ also referred to as ‘‘the traditional
device of ekphrasis’’ (191). Vasari’s descriptions are richly, if selectively
detailed, and ‘‘the picking out of details is part of the ekphrasis tradition’’
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(194–95n21). As Vasari reads Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper, for example,
the verisimilitude with which the tablecloth is rendered offsets the vividness
with which the faces of the apostles display diverse emotions—love, fear,
anger, sorrow (193). Alpers cautions that such selective description tends to
be controlled by narrative preconceptions (‘‘commonplaces’’), sometimes
even projecting onto the painting details that are not to be found there,
although they figure outside the painting in an associated narrative. ‘‘Look-
ing at art and describing what he saw legitimately involved for Vasari what we
today might think of as ‘reading in’’’ (194–95).
Webb objected that the ekphrastic tradition to which Alpers refers was
no such thing, and that in recent decades the word ekphrasis has been used
with a protean casualness. ‘‘In the absence of an agreed definition, apart
from the broadest ‘writing on art,’ each critic is able, effectively, to redefine
the term to suit his or her interests and to fit the corpus of works chosen as
representative’’ (17). So be it. Today it is hard not to contemplate the many
tags being volunteered for pictures as composing a communal ekphrasis,
necessarily different, imperfect, fragmentary in its attention to selected
details, yet worthy of attention and even respect; as, for example, apropos
Magritte’s La trahison des images, ‘‘misleading, irony, french, pipe, simple,
surreal, writing, brown, black, tan.’’
Tags as Graffiti
The word ‘‘tag’’—noun and verb—traces back to Middle English.
At first denoting a pendant fragment or ribbon of clothing, it came to mean
an appendage generally, and then an appended label—eventually just
becoming synonymous with ‘‘label.’’ In the 1940s the word was used to name
a part of computer code that labeled a particular piece of data, enabling
cross-reference.39 When the del.icio.us social-bookmarking site launched in
2003, the word ‘‘tag’’ was used as a matter of course to refer to a distinctive
and accessible bookmark label. Not long after the founders of Flickr
launched their photo-sharing site in 2004, they followed that lead to enable
photo ‘‘tagging.’’ As Eric Costello, an early developer, recalled in 2006:
Tags were not in the initial version of Flickr. Stewart Butterfield [a founder] wanted
to add them. He liked the way they worked on del.icio.us. . . . We added very simple
tagging functionality, so you could tag your photos, and then look at all your photos
with a particular tag, or any one person’s photos with a particular tag.
Soon thereafter, users started telling us that what was really interesting about tag-
ging was not just how you’ve tagged your photos, but how the whole Flickr commu-
nity has been tagging photos. So we started seeing a lot of requests from users to be
able to see a global view of the tagscape.40
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‘‘The tagscape’’ soon became a feature of the photo archives of institutions
as well as persons. As has already been mentioned, the success of Flickr gave
rise to The Commons, a multi-institutional social image-tagging site that was
launched in 2008, pioneered by the Library of Congress. Your Paintings
entered the tagscape three years later, on 23 June 2011.41
Costello’s comments, at this point and later in his interview, recognize
how tagging can be at once personal and social, egocentric and informa-
tional. They do not register the fact that the personal, expressive side of
‘‘tagging’’ came to the fore in quite a different, older context—the world of
graffiti. Since the 1980s the most personal form of graffiti has been called
a ‘‘tag’’—a self-label, a stylized signature.42 Rarely singular, tagging is repet-
itive, reproductive, akin to spam in that respect, but usually better designed,
more stylized, more stylish, more attractive, more an object of display, and
sometimes even creditable—and taggable—as a work of art.43
The hazard in socially tagging works of art online is that such tagging,
necessarily self-expressive to some extent (like graffiti tagging in the world),
may fail to inform about anything other than the style of the self, slighting
‘‘the object as in itself it really is.’’44 As this quotation from Matthew Arnold’s
much-rehearsed slogan acknowledges, such a hazard is not new, only the
medium is. So Dewey, in Art as Experience, again following A. C. Bradley (just
before the passage discussed earlier), dreads the self-absorption of the gal-
lerygoer who sees on the wall only his idiosyncratic concerns or received
ideas, ignoring the work of art itself:
Mr. Bradley calls attention to the common tendency to treat a work of art as a mere
reminder of something, by the illustration of the sight-seer in a picture-gallery who
remarks as he moves along, ‘‘This picture is so like my cousin,’’ or that picture ‘‘the
image of my birthplace,’’ and ‘‘who, after satisfying himself that one painting is
about Elijah, passes on rejoicing to discover the subject and nothing but the subject
of the next one.’’45
Yes, recognize the ‘‘subject,’’ but pay more attention to the ‘‘substance’’—
and just forget about the cousin and the birthplace. Presumably the Your
Paintings Tagger algorithm would favor the iconographic tag (Elijah) and
discard the private projection: the eccentric response, the outlier tag, the
unique ekphrastic gloss.
Tags Latent and Patent
Tags can serve several functions. Although they mainly enable
searching on a term and thus provide access to an image of a relevant
painting, they will also, if displayed near the image, direct the viewer’s
attention to something to see in the painting and may even link to other
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paintings that are similarly tagged. Like any form of annotation or commen-
tary, a displayed cluster of tags will bias attention in certain directions; if
some aspects are noticed, others, perhaps equally noteworthy, will be
ignored. A case in point is the cloud of tags that hovers at Art UK below the
image of Still Life with a Lobster and Oysters, an oil painting credited to ‘‘V.
Schut,’’ which is said to have been made around 1850 (fig. 6).46 It was
bequeathed by Clement Roebuck to the Craven Museum and Gallery, Skip-
ton, North Yorkshire, in 1988. These were the tags, thirty-one altogether,
that Your Paintings displayed for this painting in September 2015:
Food, Fruit, Knife, Orange, Grapes, Platter, Grape, Vase, Goblet, Table, Still Life,
Tablecloth, Plate, Wine, Silver, Vine, Lemon, Glass, Pomegranate, Oysters, Shell,
Oyster, Lobster, Bread, Pipe, Clay Pipe, Wine Glass, Smoking Pipe, Crayfish, Oyster-
shell, Still life.47
These tags appear to be in no particular order; they may be sequenced as
they were first entered by taggers. The co-occurrence of Still Life and Still life
may reflect options that were available to the tagger in the separate cate-
gories ‘‘Things’’ and ‘‘Painting Types.’’ A more ordinary duplication involves
singular and plural: we have both Oyster and Oysters, Grape and Grapes.48 On
the other hand, we have Knife but not Knives: one knife shows its blade at the
lower left, but the other, laid across it, is partly obscured and goes unno-
ticed. Shell and Oystershell are two ways of naming (in this case) the same
figure 6. V. Schut [or v. Schut], Still Life with a Lobster and Oysters. Oil on canvas.
Circa 1850(?). Craven Museum and Gallery, Roebuck Collection,
Skipton. Photo credit: Craven Museum and Gallery. Licensed under CC
BY-NC-ND.
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Things; and again the objects are plural, not singular. Pipe, Clay Pipe, and
Smoking Pipe are three labels for only one Thing. Lobster and Crayfish are
competing terms for the same imaged Thing: which is it? Glass and Wine
Glass are the same Thing; or is it Glass and (glass) Goblet (resting on its side,
to the left)? And is that really a Vase to the right? Or something else? And
why no mention of that large green leaf in the upper left? Perhaps a grape
leaf? The Vine does get tagged. And what is that long, twisted brown Thing
draped from the center over the right edge of the table? Fairly conspicuous,
but unidentified.
The attribution of this painting to ‘‘V. Schut’’ by Your Paintings (now by
Art UK), and the dating of it as ‘‘c. 1850,’’ both follow the entry in a published
catalog, which gives a variant title, Still Life with Grapes, Oysters, a Lemon and
Pomegranates on a Draped Table.49 Describing the painting for a later project,
Lisa Howard assigned it to the seventeenth century (estimating a range from
1630 to 1700), which does seem more likely.50 She placed ‘‘Schut, V.’’ as
a ‘‘Dutch artist, active 17th century.’’ She also reported the inscription, lower
right, as ‘‘v. Schut’’—which suggests that the painter was van Schut, not V.
Schut. Neither name is readily identifiable. (However, the signature ‘‘v.
Schut’’ figured also on a similar painting that was sold at auction in 2015.)51
Whoever did paint Still Life with a Lobster and Oysters, and whenever, the
result looks to be a close copy of Still Life, Breakfast with Champaign Glass and
Pipe, a painting that Jan Davidsz. de Heem painted in 1642, which is now
housed in the Residenzgalerie, Salzburg (fig. 7). In a catalog entry, after
figure 7. Jan Davidsz. de Heem, Still Life, Breakfast with Champaign Glass and Pipe.
Oil on oak panel. 1642. Residenzgalerie, Salzburg.
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describing many of the luxurious and sensuous attractions that this still life
displays, Thomas Habersatter notes that they are all ironized by vanitas
symbols: ‘‘the glowing fuse, the pipe . . . the overturned rummer.’’52 The
glowing fuse is the brown cord draped around the silver beaker (not a Vase)
and the pomegranate sections next to it. The fuse appears also in the Craven
Museum painting, but was not tagged. Admittedly the fuse is more conspic-
uous in the de Heem original, draped as it is over the front of the table, with
a lit end glowing in full view, close to the picture plane and set off against the
dark edge of the table. Originally used to fire guns, such match-cords were
also used to light pipes. The same motif figures in other Dutch paintings of
the period.53 A textbook precedent is the rapidly burning fuse shown in
plate 24 of Roemer Visscher’s emblem book Sinnepoppen (Amsterdam,
1614), where it symbolizes the evanescence of all things.
Symbolism is not just a layer of meaning on top of a thing, but a motive
for putting the thing there and also for noticing it. Someone alert to vanitas
imagery is more likely to notice the fuse in the Craven Museum painting.
Some things that we see in pictures we see because we see they signify.
Despite the assurances of the Your Paintings Tagger FAQ, it helps to know
something about art history just to see some Things in paintings. Or, sym-
bolism and art history aside, it helps just to know something about history.
To see a brown cord as a fuse, a tool that can be used to light a pipe, it helps
to know that Dutch smokers once lit their pipes with such things. Knowing
about such things helps to see them at all. ‘‘All seeing is seeing-as’’ may be an
overstated maxim, but it is not vacuous.54 ‘‘What you see, is that’’: what you
see, you see as something.
Cloudy Tags
What is seen can also be said, more or less. All commentary is
partial commentary, but the commentary of a cluster of tags, whether
weighted or not, is especially likely to be incomplete, and to be awkward
in its incompletion. Consider, for example, the verbal cubism of this cluster:
‘‘misleading, irony, french, pipe, simple, surreal, writing, brown, black, tan.’’
With their blunt statement and sharp elbows, these faceted terms rather
obscure than reveal the content of Magritte’s painting. As target terms and
finding aids they would function well enough behind the scenes, bringing
the user who wanted to see a painting of a pipe, or just something brown, to
contemplate this painting among others. However, if such tags were pre-
sented as descriptive, they would be literally prejudicial, preprocessing the
picture in advance of any contemplation. Describing something is different
from issuing a search inquiry (a representative speech act, not a directive, in
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John Searle’s terms); therefore describing is subject to a different kind of
assessment.55 The first submaxim of Paul Grice’s ‘‘Maxim of Quantity’’
applies here: ‘‘Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).’’56 In such cases less is not more; the
display of a limited tag set will be reductive. Better, then, to leave the tags
latent, not patent, responsive to search but not by default on display as
a description; something, rather, that can be toggled on by choice. That is
how LACMA arranges matters in this case, as in others (although for many,
if not most, other paintings the report is, ‘‘This item has not been tagged
yet’’). Better, that is, unless a purpose for the image-tagging system is to
enlist and reward (with the display of such tags) participation from mem-
bers of the public as a way of extending institutional outreach: ‘‘networking
and community building’’ in the words of one review article; ‘‘engaging the
public’’ as Andrew Greg put it in the title of his 2014 presentation at the
University of Edinburgh.57 If tags are to be sought from the public, an overt
display of tags that have already been accepted for a painting can strengthen
the invitation to add a tag. So, on 28 January 2021, the web page at the
Philadelphia Museum of Art that displayed an image of Courbet’s oil paint-
ing Waves (1869; fig. 8) also displayed, directly below it, the following tag set,
above a link that read Add Your Own Tags:
beach [x] coast [x] overcast [x] realism [x] rowboat [x] seascape [x] seaside [x]
storm [x] violent [x] waves [x]58
figure 8. Gustave Courbet, Waves. Oil on canvas. 1869. Philadelphia Museum of
Art: Gift of John G. Johnson for the W. P. Wilstach Collection, 1905,
W1905-1-1.
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Conveniently, each of these tags was hyperlinked, enabling quick access to
images of other paintings bearing the same tag: 118 other images in the case
of beach. Unusually, the Philadelphia Museum website included an ‘‘[x]’’
link next to each posted tag, which anyone could use to delete it, after
responding positively to the cautionary query, ‘‘Are you sure that you want
to delete this?’’ Yes for dark, french, and tides.59 Apparently no one tagged this
painting oil painting, which would have been Stein’s preference, unclouded
by all the other distracting terms.
The austerity of Stein’s gaze, averted from representational content in
paintings, has its modern counterpart in the tact with which a museum may
choose not to display a tag set at all. The web page at the Indianapolis
Museum of Art for Georges Lemmen’s The Two Sisters or the Serruys Sisters
shows no tags (as of 19 January 2021): just an image of the painting (zoom-
able to display the pointillist technique in remarkable detail), a curator’s
note (including tabbed entries for ‘‘Gallery Label,’’ ‘‘Related Text,’’ and
‘‘Provenance’’), some ‘‘Object Information,’’ and a half dozen smaller
images of paintings that, a heading suggests, ‘‘You May Also Like.’’ The top
of the page is particularly discreet, showing the image alone against a white
figure 9. Screen shot, Indianapolis Museum of Art, top of web page, 10 January
2012, documenting The Two Sisters or the Serruys Sisters by Georges
Lemmen (oil on canvas with painted wood frame, 1894). Photo credit:
Andrew Greg.
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background.60 Early in 2012, however, that image had been overshadowed
by a differentially weighted tag cloud, headed ‘‘What Others Saw,’’ below the
invitation, ‘‘Tell Us What You See’’ (fig. 9). According to Greg, the cloud was
moved to the bottom of the page later that year; now it is no longer dis-
played, although individual tags continue to respond to searches.61 Was the
cloud discarded as a kind of defacement of the painting, an indulgence in
graffiti?
In any case, when displayed, such a display could be improved. A heter-
ogenous list of labels below or even next to an image fails to show where in
the image these Things are to be found. Almost five centuries ago, Andreas
Vesalius managed to connect the label and the location of the depicted
Thing in an anatomical image by superimposing index numbers and
letters upon it, and transparent overlays can do similar work for illustra-
tions in books.62 Image mapping was not built into the steve.museum
and Your Paintings Tagger projects. However, the work reported in the
next section does incorporate automatic image segmentation so as to
identify small objects, a process that could facilitate the highlighting of
a tagged detail.
Automatic Tagging
In his 2014 presentation Greg noted that it was taking volunteer
taggers longer than had been anticipated to complete the Your Paintings
Tagger project, and he pointed to research undertaken by the Oxford Visual
Geometry Group as promising to automate much of the process. Eliot J.
Crowley and Andrew Zisserman had collated a subset of already tagged Your
Paintings images against labeled photographs mined from the Google
Images database, congruent features then being applied to filter the entire
Your Paintings database using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). The
result was a large set of new image tags that were collectively valid to a sig-
nificant extent but variable in quality. Given a harvest half wheat, half chaff,
the Public Catalogue Foundation recruited two hundred fifty experienced
taggers to winnow it by hand, a process that in two months yielded almost
a million tags that recognized two hundred kinds of things in almost a hun-
dred thousand images; these were added to the Your Paintings database, now
Art UK.63
In 2015 Crowley and Zisserman launched an online ‘‘Visual Search of
Paintings’’ tool, which harvests from the Google Images database represen-
tative images that have already been tagged for a particular concept (for
example, beard); it then extracts significant aspects from them on the fly,
using CNN, and applies those aspects as facets to filter the Your Paintings
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database, yielding up to ten thousand images of paintings (and now other
works) that might qualify for the tag.64 If a search term has already been
processed by the system, linked thumbnail images of the paintings will be
displayed immediately. If a term is fresh (not already searched), the system
will take a few seconds to assemble a set of relevant tagged images from
Google Images, displaying thumbnails for them one by one as they are
acquired; it will then use that set to filter the Art UK database and display
the results—all in less than ten seconds. A trial run on the fresh search term
table on 29 January 2021 quickly generated images of ten thousand items in
the Art UK collection (mostly paintings, though also some drawings, sculp-
tures, and photographs), many of which indeed showed conspicuous tables,
even though they are not yet tagged table : for example, two genre paintings
by ‘‘Royal Academicians’’ (tagged as such—the only tag displayed for these
paintings): A Difficulty, by Arthur Hacker (1858–1919); and Sunday Morning,
by William Edward Stott (1859–1918).65 In the latter case the table, though
conspicuous, is almost entirely obscured by a tablecloth. Now you see it, now
you don’t, or vice versa.
The ‘‘Visual Search of Paintings’’ process works well enough for nouns
that usually name a single concept, such as horse. It predictably falters with
homonyms such as bank, or robust polysemes such as pipe. The forty-six
training images of pipe harvested by the system from Google Images
included lots of tubular pipes and fewer pipes for tobacco; therefore, only
a few of the reported paintings display a pipe suitable for smoking. Such
semantic ambiguity presents a problem, one among many, but it is not
insuperable. In this as in other respects it will not be surprising if automatic
tagging of things in paintings continues to improve. ‘‘If a human can do it,
a computer should be able to do it,’’ Zisserman is said to have said.66 Some-
day, what the computer sees, is that.
Epilogue
During the several years in which I have been following the for-
tunes of the Your Paintings Tagger project, Julia Thomas has led two substan-
tial projects that involve the digitization and display of illustrations that were
published in magazines and books, the Database of Mid-Victorian Wood-
Engraved Illustration, and, more recently The Illustration Archive: Illuminating
the Past.67 The former was modest in scope, presenting high-resolution scans
of wood-engraved illustrations that had been ‘‘published in or around
1862.’’ The project editors tagged these images by hand, using terms drawn
from a custom-made hierarchical system of descriptive terms.68 The Illustra-
tion Archive is vastly more ambitious, involving the tagging of more than
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a million book and journal illustrations that had been scanned by Microsoft
and were made available by the British Library. Here close editorial curation
was out of the question, and crowdsourcing was the first practical resort—to
be bolstered later, perhaps, by computer-image annotation. As of 29 January
2021, 86,082 of these images had been tagged, some several times, totaling
186,779 tags.69
Professor Thomas’s book Nineteenth-Century Illustration and the Digital:
Studies in Word and Image (2017) is an often subtle discussion, prompted
by practical experience, of the possibilities and pitfalls of verbal tagging of
images—whether by experts or crowdsourced amateurs—whether they be
images of paintings, illustrations, maps, or decorations.70 Many of her inci-
dental observations about the Your Paintings project are helpful supple-
ments to what I report here—for example, that it was constructed in
nationalistic terms for British citizens to contribute to the elucidation and
celebration of British possessions (73). A notable aspect of the book is its
ambivalence about the illustration-annotation projects that it explains and
advocates, doomed to inadequacy as any verbal response to a picture must
be, because ‘‘the illusion of the equivalence of word and image on which
both keywords and prose descriptions depend is only ever an illusion: words
do not seamlessly map onto pictures. Indeed, in many ways, the activity of
tagging is not actually one of ‘mapping’ at all, but of interpretation’’ (56).
The same is true of the activity of seeing, or seeing-as. When we say what
we see we are at least twice interpreting: thrice when we see pictures, even
(pace Stein) oil paintings, and say what it is that we see in them.
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